Empirical Security Analysis & Engineering

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- Often: too hard, complex, or uneconomical to do right

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- There are countless examples where security failed in realworld deployment, sometimes spectacularly.
- Often: too hard, complex, or uneconomical to do right
- We look at lessons learnt and some hands-on practice
- We learn from empirical measurement

Internet routing




CNET + Tech Culture + How Pakistan knocked YouTube offline (and how to make sure it never happens again

How Pakistan knocked YouTube offline (and how to make sure it never happens again)

YouTube becoming unreachable isn't the first time that Internet addresses were hijacked. But if it spurs interest in better security, it may be the last.

by Declan McCullagh y Ordeclanm / February 25, 2008 2:30 PM PST / Updated: February 25, 2008 4:28 PM PST

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This graph that network-monitoring nrm keyhote systems provided to us shows the worldwide availability of YouTube.com dropping dramatically from 100 percent to 0 percent for over an hour. It didn't recover completely until two hours had elapsed.

eynote Systems

What can empirical analysis tell us?

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Web PKI: DigiNotar meltdown

	Certificate	×
Invalid Server Certificate	General Details Certification Path	
You attempted to reach www.google.com, but the server presented an invalid certificate. Back Back	t by a third	
Histo ms understand When you connect to a secure website, the server hosting that site presents your browser with somethin This certificate contains identity information, such as the address of the website, which is verified by at the checking that the address in the certificate matches the address of the website, it is possible to verify the website your intereski, and not a thrift your (you has an attractive on your network).		
In this case, the server certificate or an intermediate CA certificate presented to your browser is invalid. T malformed, contains invalid fields, or is not supported.	This	View Certificate
	Certificate status: This certificate is OK.	
	Learn more about <u>certification paths</u>	
		ОК

What happened here?

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Massively broken crypto

Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices

We performed a large-scale study of RSA and DSA cryptographic keys in use on the Internet and discovered that significant numbers of keys are insecure due to insufficient randomness. These keys are being used to secure TLS (HTTPS) and SSH connections for hundreds of thousands of hosts.

- We found that 5.57% of TLS hosts and 9.60% of SSH hosts share public keys in an apparently vulnerable manner, due to either insufficient randomness during key generation or device default keys.
- We were able to remotely obtain the RSA private keys for 0.50% of TLS hosts and 0.03% of SSH hosts because their public keys shared nontrivial common factors due to poor randomness.
- · We were able to remotely obtain the DSA private keys for 1.03% of SSH hosts due to repeated signature randomness.

Nearly all the vulnerable hosts are headless and embedded network devices, such as routers, firewalls, and server management cards. These types of devices often generate keys automatically on first boot, and lack many of the physical sources of randomness used by traditional PCs to generate random numbers. We identified apparently vulnerable devices and software from 54 manufacturers and notified these companies about the problems.

In experiments with several popular open-source software components, we were able to reproduce these vulnerabilities and show how such weak keys can arise in practice. Most critically, we found that the Linux random number generator can produce predictable output at boot under certain conditions, athough we also observed compromised keys on BSD and Windows-based systems.

Learn more:



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Broken operations: DNS/DNSSEC

Understanding the Role of Registrars in DNSSEC Deployment

Taejoong Chung Northeastern University

Dave Levin University of Maryland Roland van Rijswijk-Deij University of Twente and SURFnet

> Bruce M. Maggs Duke University and Akamai Technologies

Christo Wilson Northeastern University David Choffnes Northeastern University

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ABSTRACT

The Domain Name System (DNS) provides a scalable, flexible name resolution service. Unfortunately, its unauthenticated architecture has become the basis for many security attacks. To address this, DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) were introduced in 1997. DNSSEC's deployment requires support from the top-level domain (TLD) registries and registrars, as well as participation by the organization that serves as the DNS operator. Unfortunately, DNSSEC has seen poor deployment thus far: despite being proposed nearly two decades ago, only 1% of . com, .net, and .org domains are properly signed.

In this paper, we investigate the underlying reasons why DNSSEC adoption has been remarkably slow. We focus on registrars, as most TLD registries already support DNSSEC and registrars often serve as DNS operators for their customers. Our study uses large-scale, longitudinal DNS measurements to study DNSSEC adoption, cou-

CCS CONCEPTS

- Security and privacy \rightarrow Public key (asymmetric) techniques;

 Networks → Application layer protocols; Security protocols; Naming and addressing;

KEYWORDS

DNS; DNSSEC; DNS Security Extension; PKI; Public Key Infrastructure; Registrar; DNS Operator

ACM Reference format:

Taejoong Chung, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, David Choffnes, Dave Levin, Bruce M. Maggs, Alan Mislove, and Christo Wilson. 2017. Understanding the Role of Registrars in DNSSEC Deployment. In Proceedings of IMC '17, London, United Kingdom, November 1–3, 2017, 15 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3131365.313137



Measuring privacy leaks



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